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ABSTRACT
David Hume's main philosophical works address the
question of how to guarantee individual liberty whilst
ensuring social cohesion. This question arose through changes
occurring in the mid-eighteenth century. One of the most
fundamental changes was the appearance of a new commercial
ideology that conflicted with traditional ways in which
society defined itself and the role of the individual.
Hume was essentially an apologist for this commercial
ideology and this thesis examines his attempts to find an
answer to the question of social cohesion. Hume's epistemology
is examined in the light of this search for social cohesion
and this thesis argues that the credibility of Hume's
epistemology relies on his aesthetic philosophy. Finally,
Hume's writings on aesthetics reveal that he is only able to
find a model of social unity at the expense of some
individuals' liberty.

iii

DAVID HUME AND THE SEARCH FOR SOCIAL CONSENSUS

David Hume's main philosophical works, as well as his
political and social commentaries, show him to be consistently
grappling with a central and ineluctable problem. This problem
is the balance between individual liberty and social cohesion.
The problem might be summarized by a brief question: What
model of social unity would guarantee the rights of the
individual and the freedom to act on one's passions whilst
also ensuring the well-being of society as a whole? This
thesis will establish the context which defined the problem of
social unity for Hume and will then focus on Hume's attempt to
find a solution to the problem.
The

emergence

of

a

new

and

highly

controversial

commercial ethic or ideology precipitated Hume's investigation
into liberty and social cohesion. This ideology was primarily
concerned with the actions of the individual within a world
defined in terms of commodities.

That is to say, a world in

which commercial transactions, profit and loss, and the cash
nexus became the matrix by which the relationships between
individuals,

and the

relationship

between

individual

and

society, were defined. However, this commercial ideology was
incompatible with traditional ways in which society defined
itself and the role of the individual.
One of the main incompatibilities was that between the
new commercial ideology and classical republican theory that
2
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had played an important role in the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth

centuries.

ideology envisioned a

Broadly

speaking,

this

republican

society in which individuals curbed

their personal desires for the sake of social cohesion. As
Thomas Horne suggests, republican ideology appealed to the
individual's ability to recognize a public interest and to act
upon this interest so as to ensure the proper operation of the
"social organism"

(Horne X) . Horne further points out that

whereas republican theory "depended on the willingness [of the
individual]
tended

to

to adopt a public stance,
change

selfishness,

legitimate

concerns

commercial activity
for

the

self

into

to enlarge private concerns and diminish the

awareness of public needs" (Horne X) . Classical republicanism
was,

therefore,

premises

of

the

fundamentally
commercial

in

conflict

ideology.

with
While

the
Hume

very
is

essentially an apologist for the new commercial ideology, he
is acutely aware of the problems faced by the conflict between
the republican model of society and a new ideology that
elevates the passions and desires of the individual over
social unity.
Hume's search for a model of social unity is clear in his
main philosophical works, the Treatise of Human Nature (173940), An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), and An
Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751); and in
them Hume lays out his epistemological position as well.
Although a discussion of epistemology may seem at first far
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removed from the subject of liberty and social cohesion, upon
further analysis we may see in Hume's epistemology an implicit
concern with problems of individuality and universality that
paves the way for the discussion of the individual and his
relationship to society in An Enquiry Concerning the Principle
of Morals.
Hume attempts to find consensus among individuals through
an

epistemology

that

is

grounded

in

the

senses

—

an

epistemology that values passion, or the senses, over reason.
In Book I of A Treatise of Human Nature, the founding premises
of the passional epistemology are found in the distinction
between two kinds of perceptions: "impressions" and "ideas."
(By "impressions" are meant all the "sensations, passions and
emotions" and by "ideas" are meant the fainter images of those
sensations and passions we generally truck in while thinking
and reasoning

[1]).

The further observation that all our

simple ideas are derived from simple impressions forms one of
the critical tenets of Hume's epistemology; the precedence of
impressions essentially collapses reason into sensation and
leads to an epistemology that is grounded in the body and its
sensations.
The appeal to the passions of man rather than to reason
enables Hume to find a way of speaking to man's individuality
as well as his need for social unity. In grounding his theory
of knowledge in the body Hume has chosen the lowest common
denominator,

for the body is that which is particular to
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everyone and yet common to all. And the turn to the body in
Hume's epistemology provides him with a general model in which
some common ground could be found between the passions of
diverse

men.

Hume's

passional

epistemology,therefore,

addresses the main problem faced by the commercial ideology
which, as we saw, was to restrain the individual passions, so
as to prevent the pursuit of economic gain from wrecking any
cohesive

structure

in

which

people

might

operate.

However, this passional epistemology may create as many
problems as it solves in its attempt to find a model of
consensus, for different men's passions may have no common
ground. If so, then the strength of Hume's epistemology might
be its weakness. Hume's epistemology suggests that the ways in
which we make sense of the world evolve independently of each
other through our impressions, so the passional epistemology
is in danger of totally subjectivising any knowledge thereby
ruining

any

common

ground

among

individuals.

Hume's

philosophy is, therefore, in danger of lapsing into solipsism,
as he suggests in the conclusion to Book I of the Treatise: "I
am first affrighted and confounded with the forelorn solitude,
in which I am plac'd in my philosophy"

(264) .

It is this

dilemma facing Hume's epistemology that we will see recurring
in Hume's work as he attempts to find some social consensus
and some way to establish a firm basis for social unity.
In

his

celebrated

discussion

of

causality,

Hume

addresses exactly this problem of how to find some common

ground among the sensory experiences of individuals.
has

subsumed

Reason

under

the

senses,

it

As Hume

follows

that

causality must be a fiction of the imagination for it cannot
be generated

from any

impression.

The only perceivable

impressions that we can observe in the relationship between
"cause" and "effect" are contiguity and temporal succession,
which alone do not account for any impression of causation.
The only way that causal reasoning is possible is through
experience, a position leading Hume to conclude that "all our
reasonings concerning causes and effects are derived from
nothing but custom" (183).

So as to guarantee a common ground

between the experiences of individuals Hume's argument has to
fall back onto custom and precedent and consequently comes to
nullify the more individualistic implications of his passional
epistemology.

The basis for one of the prime guides of human

life, i.e. causal reasoning, now operates in terms of what has
gone before and therefore denies the individual any part in
the reasoning process.

From a philosophy which seemingly

empowers the individual we have now moved to a position that
appeals to custom, and tradition, for its basis.

So we can

see in Hume's discussion of causality that the passional
epistemology has difficulties in finding common ground among
the experiences of individuals and has to go outside of the
senses to find any consensus.

In political terms, Hume's

appeal to custom is significant for it seemingly elevates
traditional assumptions and institutions over the concerns of
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the individual. It therefore cannot guarantee both individual
liberty and social cohesion.
The

problem

of

consensus

raised

by

the

passional

epistemology is also present in Hume's discussion of morality.
Morality, says Hume in Book III of the Treatise.
consists not in any matter of fact, which can be
discovered by the understanding.... So that when
you pronounce any action or character to be
vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the
constitution of your nature you have a feeling or
sentiment of blame from the contemplation of
it.(469)
Morality, falling within "practical" rather than "speculative"
philosophy, is a subject that influences human passions and
actions. As reason has "no influence on our passions and
actions" then morality can never be derived from Reason,
"because Reason alone... can never have any such influence....
The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our
reason"

(475).

Reason does,

however,

reappear in Hume's

discussion of morality and with its reappearance Hume invokes
an interesting analogy with the arts.
In bringing morality into the realm of the senses, Hume
has

done

two

things:

he

has

totally

subjectivized

the

operation of morality, for it has now become an individual
matter of distinguishing between certain impressions much as
in our decisions concerning sound and taste.

"Vice and

virtue," suggests Hume, "may be compar'd to sounds, colours,
heat and cold, which according to modern philosophy, are not
qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind..." (469).
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Second, however, morality's basis in sensation has the danger
of allowing each individual his own moral code, as we decide
which colour, sound, and action pleases us.

The way out of

this possibly anarchic situation is to appeal to a distinct
and universal "moral sense" that attaches either pleasure or
pain to the observation of certain human actions: "There is no
spectacle so fair and beautiful as a noble and generous
action; nor any which gives us more abhorrence than one that
is cruel and treacherous" (470) .

But as we shall see, the

appeal

to this moral sense is not without its problems as

Hume's

argument is caught within the problem of how to draw

any universal inferences; the "reasons" he gives within his
argument are going to rely on his individual impressions.

We

can see this problem emerging as Hume continues his discussion
of morality:
An action, or a sentiment, or character is virtuous
or vicious; why? because its view causes a pleasure
or uneasiness of a particular kind. In giving a
reason, therefore, for the pleasure or uneasiness,
we sufficiently explain the vice or virtue. To have
the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a
satisfaction of a particular kind.... The case is
the same as in our judgments concerning all kinds of
beauty, and tastes.... (470)
In introducing the word "reason"

into the above argument

establishing the connection between morality and feelings of
pleasure and uneasiness, Hume's discussion of morality is in
danger of collapsing. With the

introduction of Reason, Hume

must

the

therefore

rely,

under

dictates

of

his own

epistemology, upon his own sensations, for in Hume's passional
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epistemology,

Reason

is a slave to sensation.

So Hume's

argument is in danger of saying nothing as it can only appeal
to sensation and sentiment in each stage of its conception, as
each assertion comes full circle to rest on the thesis it is
attempting to establish.
The problem therefore remains that morality may still be
a totally subjective operation even with the posited universal
moral sense.

For Hume's discussion of morality, as we have

just seen, may be particular to himself as his conclusions are
drawn from his own feelings. The relation between morality and
a universal moral sense can only be established through Hume's
observations and these, of course, are founded on his own
impressions.
As we saw in his discussion of causality, Hume has to go
outside

of

the

individuals.

senses

to

find

any

common

ground

among

Likewise the discussion of morality in the

Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals has to fix some
general principles which precede the operation of sentiment:
But in order to pave the way for such a sentiment
[moral], and give a proper discernment of its
object, it is often necessary, we find, that much
reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions be
made, just conclusions drawn, distant comparisons
formed, complicated relations examined, and general
facts fixed and ascertained. (15)
To avoid the subjectivization of morality, Hume appeals to a
"proper" sentiment which is established by reasoning.

It is

essentially this reasoning that becomes the basis for any
moral judgment and so morality becomes a process of drawing

careful

distinctions,

and

well-balanced

examining complicated relations.
causality,

conclusions

and

As with Hume's argument on

the appeal to sensation has to be momentarily

abandoned so that some common and stable ground can be found
by which actions can be judged.
We have already seen how Hume's discussion of morality
uses an analogy with the arts to elucidate his argument.

Hume

continues his discussion of morality quoted above with another
example drawn from the arts, which suggests that beauty, like
morality, might also have to be properly distinguished before
it can be felt:
Some species of beauty, especially the natural
kinds, on their first appearance, command our
affection and approbation; and where they fail of
this effect, it is impossible for any reasoning to
redress their influence, or adapt them better to
our taste and sentiment. But in many orders of
beauty, particularly those of the finer arts, it is
requisite to employ much reasoning, in order to
feel the proper sentiment; and a false relish
may frequently be corrected by argument and
reflection. There are just ground to conclude, that
moral beauty partakes much of this latter species,
and demands the assistance of our intellectual
faculties.... (15)
This is primarily an argument about morality but the example
Hume draws from the arts is important.

As we can see from the

quotation above, judgments of beauty are the same as moral
judgments in that they operate on the basis of feelings of
pleasure and uneasiness. As we distinguish between virtue and
vice on the basis of our impressions, so we make aesthetic
decisions in exactly the same way. So aesthetics now becomes
a matter of feeling pleasure and uneasiness just as in the
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case of morality.

But as Hume's moral and aesthetic theories

share a common epistemology
sharing common problems.

then we might expect to see them

If his discussion of morals runs the

risk of totally subjectivizing morality then his aesthetic
theory faces the same problem.
As with the argument on morality, Hume has to avoid the
total subjectivization of aesthetics judgments implied by
their basis in sensation. As Peter Jones points out, Hume has
to constantly

avoid the proverb that

it is pointless

to

dispute matters of taste and sentiment, as Jones suggests,
’’that view ultimately threatens not only his account of moral
judgment,
(Jones

but

107).

also his
Hume

central

therefore

epistemological

has

to

position"

find some

way

of

reconciling matters of taste and sentiment.
As we can see, the comparison Hume draws between morality
and

aesthetic

judgment,

discussion of morality,
consensus and
aesthetic.

rather

than

elucidating

Hume's

merely replicates the problem of

shifts the argument

into the realm of the

The problem of finding a possible ground for

judgment or agreement between men's sentiments or tastes finds
its fullest exposition in Hume's aesthetic essay "Of the
Standard of Taste."

In this essay Hume seeks to find a

"Standard of Taste; a rule by which the various sentiments of
men may be reconciled" and with which to confront the axiom
that to "seek the real beauty,

or real deformity,

is as

fruitless an inquiry, as to pretend to ascertain the real
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sweet or the real bitter" (229-3 0). As before, Hume's argument
has a central dichotomy: how to steer between the Scylla of
authority and the Charybdis of total freedom. A standard of
taste must be located within the body but must also avoid an
all-inclusive

policy

on

taste

which

would

disrupt

any

consensus (Shusterman 215). As Hume cannot find an ontological
basis for aesthetic value, he attempts to find value through
rules founded on the observations of common sentiment.

So

whilst "beauty is not a quality in things themselves:

It

exist[ing] merely in the mind which contemplates them," Hume
does

attempt

to

find

some

standard

of

beauty

through

observation of what pleases and what does not please (230).
As Peter Jones puts it:"it is a matter of fact that certain
qualities please qualified observers, and that certain works
are valued because they possess those qualities and thereby
come to functions as models" (Jones 108).

The rules which

make up the artifact are not "fixed by reasonings a priori"
but

through

observation;

Jones

continues,

"empirically

grounded rules have a scope of sufficient generality to be
genuine substitutes for... a priori standards" (Jones 108).
These rules are

"founded only on experience,

and on the

observation of the common sentiments of human nature" (232).
Hume sets about the task of finding the standard of taste
by outlining how the proper sentiments might be distinguished,
so putting him in a position to jettison any judgments of
taste which seem unusual.

Both the circumstances and the
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"serenity"

of the observer are necessary

for the proper

operation of judgment. This enables Hume to suggest that as
"particular forms or qualities, from the original structure of
the internal fabric are calculated to please, and others to
displease; and if they fail of their effect in any particular
instance, it is from some apparent’defect or imperfection in
the organ" (23 3).

Hume follows up with an analogy for this

predicament: "A man in a fever would not insist on his palate
as able to decide concerning flavours; nor would one affected
with jaundice pretend to give verdict with regard to colours"
(233).

The emphasis is on the good judgment of the observer,

the critic, and although aesthetic judgment seems to be on the
same basis as that of sight and smell, Hume is never able to
tell

us what

rules

he has managed

to

find through the

observation of "common sentiment."
Before Hume is able to describe the general rules of art,
the logic of his argument demands that he establish the proper
position of the critic whose sentiments will lead us to the
rules governing aesthetic objects.

As we have already seen,

illness and imperfection in the senses must generate dubious
judgments.

The qualified observer must also have a "delicacy

of imagination," must be practiced in the observation of a
particular art, needs to draw comparisons "between the several
species and degrees of excellence... must preserve his mind
from all prejudice" and, lastly, have a good dose of "strong
sense" (234-40). As Richard Shusterman and others have noted,
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Hume's argument is circular.

The argument, Shusterman points

out, "defines good taste and art by appeal to good critics,
but the good critics are in turn ultimately defined in terms
of

(their

experience

with

and

reaction

to)

good art"

(Shusterman 214) . It is the role of the good critics, those
qualified observers, that becomes so important in establishing
a standard of taste, and it is a standard ultimately coming to
rest on criteria far removed from the scope of the senses.
Hume's line of argument in the essay "Of the Standard of
Taste" essentially leads him to displace the whole question of
taste onto the quest for the "good critic" who sets its
standard. As it turns out the good critic is a rarity indeed,
for as Hume suggests, "few are qualified to give judgment on
any work of art,

or establish their own sentiment as the

standard of beauty" (17). After listing various ways in which
a critic may go wrong, he continues:
Under some or other of these imperfections, the
generality of men labour; and hence a true judge in
the finer arts is observed, even during the most
polished ages, to be so rare a character: strong
sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by
practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of
all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this
valuable character; and the joint verdict of such,
wherever they are to be found, is the true standard
of taste and beauty. (241)
But where, asks Hume, are such critics to be found?

Hume

realises that he has merely displaced the whole argument onto
another

level.

embarrassing;

and

"[Tjhese
seem

to

questions,"
throw

us

he

back

says,
into

the

"are
same

uncertainty from which, during the course of this Essay, we
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have endeavoured to extricate ourselves" (241).

The search

for a standard of taste has now move to a search for the
perfect critic.

But by what standard will he be judged?

Hume's answer to this is to assert that a "true and decisive
standard" exists by which we can judge the critic, one that
has real existence and

is a "matter of fact"

(242) . In

attempting to avoid an endlessly regressive debate, Hume has
to rely on plain assertion to continue his argument:
It is sufficient for our present purpose, if we
have proved, that the taste of all individuals is
not upon an equal footing, and that some men in
general, however difficult to be particularly
pitched upon, will be acknowledged by universal
sentiment to have a preference above others. (242)
In his assertion, Hume mistakenly locates the superiority of
taste held by certain critics as based on a "matter of fact"
rather

than

in

the

socially

determined

"preference above others" (242) .

basis

of

their

This categorial confusion

leads Hume out of the scope of the senses altogether.
The physical criteria demanded of the good critic in the
analogy between health and sound judgment are stretched to
other demands which have nothing to do with the senses.

As

the good critic must be free of illness and any deviancy in
perception, so should he be free of prejudice. "[P]rejudice is
destructive of sound judgment" and it is for the critic to rid
himself of such influences, so he might appreciate the work of
other cultures and ages (240). Hume seems to suggest that if
the critic can attain an unbiased and natural perception of
the artifact, then it is possible to establish the standard of

16

taste and to uncover the rules governing the work of art.
However, as Shusterman suggests, the innocent, unprejudiced
critic is simultaneously one who is educated and socially and
culturally conditioned (Shusterman 217). A good critic, for
instance,

has

to

be

able

to

compare

between

degrees

of

excellence: "A man who has had no opportunity of comparing the
different kinds of beauty, is indeed totally unqualified to
pronounce an opinion with regard to any object presented to
him” (238).
The critic must also be well practiced in the observation
of a particular art, so that he will "acquire experience in
those objects

[artifacts],"

and ensure that

"his feeling

becomes more exact and nice... (237). So while the critic has
tb free his mind from prejudice, he is also expected to use
the

criteria

of practice,

evaluate the artifact.

good

sense,

to

What can these be based on but a

culturally conceived notion of taste?
out,

and comparison

As Shusterman points

"Hume's good critic turns out to be not one without

prejudices

but

simply

one

with

the

right

prejudices"

(Shusterman 217). Hume's standard of taste has certainly found
a "rule"

by which

the various

sentiments

of men may be

reconciled, but it is one based on social privilege, rather
than

being

grounded

in

the

observation

of

the

common

sentiments of human nature.
The problem of finding some standard of taste, inherited
as it was from the discussion of morality,

has therefore

17

failed as Hume is only able to find a model of consensus which
has little to do with the senses. And as a social elite now
determines matters of taste it must also take the lead in
morality.

So both moral and aesthetic matters, and perhaps

even perception itself, are decided by those "good critics"
who can conceal the direction of their own passions under a
generally applicable rule.
Whatever the outcome of Hume's search for a standard by
which individuals' passions and tastes can be compared, it is
significant that this problem finds its fullest explication in
the realm of the aesthetic.

And the centrality

of the

aesthetic to Hume's philosophy is indicative of the importance
mid-eighteenth century society accorded to matters concerning
culture, taste, and the fine arts.

The importance of the

aesthetic was that it, unlike traditional appeals to moral
universalism, provided support for the nascent and problematic
commercial ideology. It is this aesthetic support for commerce
we can see unfolding in Hume's political and aesthetic essays.
Hume sees an intrinsic link between commerce and the arts
for they both come into existence at the same time; only when
society progresses from the first "savage state," in which all
have to fend for themselves,

to a state where production

exceeds consumption can society spare the people to develop
the arts.

In this way "the finer arts, which are commonly

denominated the arts of luxury" arise (Of Commerce 256).

The

arts, in both the essays "Of Refinement in the Arts" and "Of
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Commerce," seem to become synonymous with luxury.
establishing a link between the arts

and

And in

luxury Hume

is

implicitly registering the influence of classical republican
theory.

One of the central tenets of this theory was the

perceived incompatibility between virtue and luxury. Within
republican theory,

luxury essentially meant the ability to

produce more than a society could consume and so enabled
labour to be redistributed.

Society could then afford to

employ people within industries or activities that were not
essential to society's immediate needs. Classical republican
theory saw this redistribution of labour as a profound threat
to

the

state

for

one

of

the

possible

avenues

of

diversification might be the creation of a standing army.

And

standing armies, for Machiavelli and every republican, were an
anathema to the well-being of the state for they pose the
permanent threat of a military coup.
However, Hume seeks to undo this link between luxury and
social

disintegration.

As

he

writes

in

the

essay

"Of

Refinement in the Arts", "industry, knowledge, and humanity,
are linked together by an indissoluble chain" (271).

As the

specialization of labour produces "skillful weavers, and shipcarpenters,"

so

we

will

also

find

great

poets

and

philosophers.

For Hume, these developments must also make man

more sociable, so we see "an increase in humanity, from the
very habit of conversing together, and contributing to each
other's pleasure and entertainment" (271).

Rather than the
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destruction of liberty arising through the growth of commerce
and the consonant rise of culture and the fine arts, Hume is
suggesting,

in direct contrast to republican theory,

that

liberty and communitarian values actually prosper under a
modestly luxurious commerce.
We can,

therefore,

see how culture and the arts are

aligned with pro-commercial thought in opposition to classical
republicanism, for the arts are capable of civilizing man and
ensuring the continuation of society.

Hume explicitly refutes

the republican teleologies which saw social disaster as the
inevitable consequence of wealth and luxury.

For instance,

classical republicanism constructed a history of ancient Rome
which blamed the fall of the republic on the growth of luxury.
Hume describes it thus:
What has chiefly induced severe moralists to
declaim against refinements in arts, is the example
of ancient ROME, which joining to its poverty and
rusticity virtue and public spirit, rose to such a
surprising height of grandeur and liberty; but,
having learned from its conquered provinces the
ASIATIC luxury, fell into every kind of corruption;
whence arose sedition and civil wars, attended at
last by a total loss of liberty.(275)
Hume, however, denies that luxury can be blamed for the fall
of ancient Rome, and suggests that those who construct such a
history have mistakenly blamed the disorders on luxury, rather
than on its "ill-modelled government, and the unlimited extent
of conquests" (27 6). Refinement on the conveniences of life do
not lead to corruption. In fact, states Hume, "the liberties
of England, so far from decaying since the improvements in the
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arts, have never flourished so much as during that period"
(276-77).
Hume makes the more startling claim that liberty in fact
rests with the creation of the merchant classes, the owners of
mobile property, i.e., broadly speaking, the middle classes:
In rude unpolished nations, where the arts are
neglected, all labour is bestowed on the
cultivation of the ground; and the whole society is
divided into two classes, proprietors of land, and
their vassals or tenants. The latter are
necessarily dependent, and fitted for slavery and
subjection; especially where they possess
not riches....
(277)
This

balance

cannot

maintain

a

stable

society,

for

the

landowners become petty tyrants or attempt to assert their
independence and so fall into feuds and contests.

But it is

luxury that promotes industry and commerce, and so peasants
are

able

merchants

to

become

resulting

independent,
from

the

and

the

establishment

tradesman
of

and

commerce

"acquire a share of the property" (277) . It is this middle
class who, in direct opposition to republican theory, provide
the firmest basis of public liberty, for they will not submit
to

slavery,

as will

the

peasants,

and

equally will

not

tyrannize over others.
The status of this public liberty becomes clear in the
essay entitled "Of Commerce."

As we have already seen, the

arts emerge when agriculture can produce a surplus of what it
needs for those who work on the land.

As Hume puts it: "time

and experience improve so much these arts [agriculture], that
the land may easily maintain a much greater number of men,
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than those who are immediately employed in its culture..."
(256). Those superfluous hands can then apply themselves to
the arts of luxury. Within Hume's economic theory everybody
gains from the production of superfluities as every individual
becomes his own middleman or merchant and exchanges his labour
for the objects of passions; "Every thing in the world is
purchased by labour... the superfluity,

which arises from

their [farmers'] labour, is not lost; but is exchanged with
manufacturers for those commodities, which men's luxury now
makes them covet" (261).
As Jerome Christensen has noted, the commercial structure
envisaged by Hume promises gain for all in managing to avoid
assigning loss to anyone (Christensen 19).
theory,

Hume's economic

as Christensen goes on to point out,

places most

importance on the role of the merchant middleman, for it is
the merchant's role as the mediator between economic parties
that oils the wheels of commerce.

The privilege accorded to

the merchant is meant to rebound on Hume's own activity as an
essayist or man of letters for the essayist is also a mediator
in the intellectual transitions he makes between parties and
ideas.

But as Christensen perceptively remarks, this equation

between merchant and essayist occludes "the crucial difference
that

capital

(as

opposed

to

mere

intelligence

or

mere

technical facility) makes in raising one economic agent to
superiority over another" (Christensen 19).

If we reinsert a

notion of capital into Hume's economic formulations then we
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might emerge with a system that has to assign loss somewhere
along the line.
Despite Hume's vision of a perfectly oiled economy - one
that ensures the continuous circulation of energy without loss
- Hume seems to concede that there might be some losers.

For

instance, in Hume's discussion of the role of the labourer, he
establishes labour as a commodity which can be exchanged with
other commodities.

However, as Hume's following discussion

admits, the fact that labour can be exchanged means that it is
also possible to exploit:
It is a violent method, and in most cases
impracticable, to oblige the labourer to toil, in
order to raise from the land more than what
subsists himself and his family. Furnish him with
manufactures and commodities, and he will do it of
himself. Afterwards you will find it easy to seize
some part of his superfluous labour, and employ it
in the public service, without giving him his
wonted return. (Of Commerce 262)
Exactly what this "public service" entails is unclear but it
is likely that it involves the maintenance of an army which,
no doubt,

is involved in protecting the nation's markets -

foreign trade being high on Hume's list of priorities.

Indeed

the equation between the wealth of a kingdom, its power and
the happiness of the public seems remarkably circular, for as
a country participates in foreign commerce so it builds up the
"stock of labour" which can be "stored up against any public
exigency"

(2 61).Hume does not state what

this

"public

exigency"

might be but it would surely entail any threat to

national boundaries and the nation's mercantile activities.
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The people who seem to lose within Hume's economic visions are
those who are producing the surplus which can support the
standing army.
In Hume's

discussion of the

response

to a national

emergency, we can clearly see that his economic formulations
are going to have to assign loss somewhere along the line.
When a sovereign raises an army, and levies a tax, society has
to

retrench,

commodities

and,
"must

for
either

Hume,

those

enlist

themselves to agriculture..."(261).

in

who
the

labour
troops,

in
or

the
turn

Labourers might, in cases

of national emergency, have to enlist in the army and it is
here

that

loss might

become most visible.

As the only

commodity which the labourer has is his own body, or labour,
so he has to enter into the marketplace and with it all the
vicissitudes of supply and demand.

In the case of war this

might culminate in the labourer forever being parted from his
only capital as he is killed fighting for his country.
Hume's appeal to the aesthetic and to the growth of the
"polite arts" as a guarantee of liberty would seem to have
failed. For the aesthetic indeed may a measure of society's
commercial progress, but it is progress gained at the expense
of the liberty of others. So Hume's search for consensus, for
a standard of taste, and his consonant turn to the aesthetic
as the proof of liberty, has ended up elevating the passions
of some members of society over others.
With such possibilities in mind we can see how far we
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have travelled from the basic principles of Hume's philosophy.
Hume was attempting to find some balance between individuals'
passions and the social cohesion that would provide an arena
for their operation.

Hume, as we have seen, never managed to

find either a moral standard or a standard of taste, or any
other means by which consensus could be found among the
individual

impressions

of

diverse

men.

Thus,

Hume

consistently had to go outside of the body for any way towards
finding such a standard. And as we have seen, it was the "good
critics" who set the standard of taste and justified their own
passions

and

desires

applicable rule —
social

and

under

a

general

and

universally

a rule established through the critics'

economic

position.

So,

Hume,

perhaps

despite

himself, ends up condoning the passionally motivated actions
of some individuals while finding social unity only at the
expense of the liberty of others.

And it is ironic that given

Hume's passional epistemology the people who are constrained
within this vision of society are those whose only capital is
the body itself.
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